The Global Week Ahead: You’re Gonna Need That Holiday After This Week

Next Week's Risk Dashboard

• A week packed with central banks, fiscal updates, key data
• FOMC to cut, ignore the SEP
• US core PCE likely to validate the Fed’s cut
• Canada’s deficit under tariff scenarios
• Canadian CPI could soften
• BoC’s Macklem kicks off mandate review
• BoJ likely to hold off on a hike
• Japanese inflation to follow Tokyo’s hot print
• UK jobs, wages, CPI arrive before the BoE
• BoE: pause, while data may validate the dissenter
• Banxico: 25 or 50?
• BanRep teed up for another 50bps
• BCCh: cut with a careful bias
• Riksbank said it will cut, so it will cut!
• Norges Bank to stay on hold
• BoT unlikely to surprise again
• BI nervously watching the rupiah
• CBCT to extend pause
• BSP to cut a third time
• Central Bank of Russia to deliver mega-hike
• No change to China’s lending rates, and it wouldn’t matter anyway
• NZ fiscal update
• PMIs: EZ, UK, US, India
• Retail sales: US, Canada, UK

Chart of the Week

Deck the halls alright! There is no time or space for special topics in this week’s issue given how packed the last full week before the holiday season and year-end is going to be. Over a dozen global central banks—including heavy hitters like the Fed, BoJ and BoE—but also several Latin American, European and Asian central banks will offer decisions with what is likely to be a highly guarded stance into 2025. A potentially key speech by BoC Governor Macklem on what he may seek in the five-year mandate review follows this past week’s decision.

Major inflation reports from the US, Canada, UK and Japan will combine with global PMIs, retail sales reports from the US, Canada and UK, plus UK jobs and wages to offer elevated data risk.

And of course, Canada’s last Fall economic and fiscal update before next year’s election will seek to build upon recent announcements including encouraging ones like this past Friday’s announcements including more liberalized pension investment rules. The obsession with how big the current deficits are tracking is missing the point in terms of how tariff wars could inflame them much further—and carry much higher debt issuance along the way. The

CANADA’S BUDGET UPDATE—FISCAL GUARDRAILS SUPERSEDED BY TARIFF SCENARIOS

Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland delivers the annual Fall Economic Statement (FES) on Monday. The issues to watch for will include the size of the current fiscal year deficit, the revised outlook for deficits, and any new initiatives into an election year. But it’s what won’t be incorporated into the numbers that will draw the most intense market speculation. Nearly a decade ago we heard from Ottawa that the budget would balance itself; it’s nowhere close to doing so and it could dramatically widen further by tens of billions of dollars.

The fact that it is likely to be an election year combined with the probability that tariffs lie ahead mean that the numbers that are presented this week are likely to be mere placeholders ahead of an election-oriented Winter budget that incorporates the potential effects of tariffs. This round of numbers will incorporate the effects of policy announcements to date such as $1.6B for the GST/HST changes, while it’s uncertain whether the government will grant the NDP’s wish to sharply inflate the $4.5B cost of Trudeau bucks that are targeted to go out in April as the legislation even for that amount has yet to be passed.

Estimates of the size of the federal government’s deficit could range anywhere from the mid-$40s to mid-$50s in billions of dollars for FY23–24. Still, as a share of GDP Canada’s deficit is very small at around 1½% to 1¾% of nominal GDP compared to other countries and notably the gargantuan size of the US imbalance US (-7.1%). Canada also has a fully funded national pension unlike the mess that is social security in the US. These are why Canada is rated AAA and the US is not. Disadvantages, however, include the absence of the reserve currency privileges the US enjoys, the US advantage in having a very large and highly liquid Treasury market, and the fact that abrupt global shocks tend to disproportionately disfavour Canadian assets as a high-beta market.

And yet running deficits on a sustained basis over many years instead of repairing damage done during crises like the pandemic results in a mounting problem over time that reduces future flexibility. So does raising the share of the economy that is skewed toward shiny flashy things consumed by households and governments in the short-term instead of investing (chart 1). The stock of accumulated debt rises and with it the extent to which interest payments on the debt crowd out room to pursue other goals such as a productivity agenda.

It also leaves a country ill-prepared for further shocks. Using our estimates of the impact of tariff scenarios on GDP alone (chart 2) and combining them with Finance’s estimates of the sensitivities of the budgetary balance to real GDP growth (table A1.14 here), the federal deficit could increase by somewhere between C$20B and $30B in the first year alone and depending on the extent to which Canada may retaliate (chart 3).

This calculation rests solely upon the GDP sensitivities without considering other shocks to borrowing costs, inflation and the exchange rate. These other shocks are not additive but depend upon assumptions such as retaliation. Without retaliation, borrowing costs would probably be lowered in bull steepener fashion, but with retaliation would raise them in a bear flattener sense. Without retaliation would lower the GDP deflator, with retaliation would raise it, which matters because the deficit is ultimately driven by nominal GDP.

There are two other important assumptions. One is how long tariffs are applied. In 2018–19, Canada applied them on Canada Day after the US applied tariffs, and lifted them the following May. Tariffs this time may be short lived, or they may persist into NAFTA 3.0 negotiations.

Second is that the deficit effects noted thus far only cover automatic effects. A tariff war scenario could conceivably bring out stimulus measures directionally akin to measures undertaken at the start of the pandemic including much larger stimulus cheques. Canada is likely to allow the fiscal balance to accommodate whatever is deemed necessary to manage the effects of tariffs alongside other stabilizers like the impact on the Canadian dollar.

Nevertheless, the surprise about the surprises from Freeland's deficit guidance is that folks are surprised! How's that for a mouthful! My narrative throughout the past year was that deficits and issuance would be bigger than guided even before we knew of the tariff risks. An election year beckons. Governments throw money around into election years even when they're not polling poorly. Governments that are polling as badly as this one get even more desperate in that sense.

And with that was the guidance that issuance would be greater than the projections from the street and government. Get used to it. It's not over yet. A twelve-figure annual deficit cannot be ruled out. How it is issued depends upon how long the tensions may persist, but the distribution of issuance is likely to be shorter-term in nature. This adds to what is already a challenging debt distribution profile (chart 4).

To sum up, fiscal guardrails may be the current obsession as folks sharpen their pencils on exactly how large (or small as a % of GDP) the deficit may be now. In a tariff world, we’ll soon forget about guardrails.

CENTRAL BANKS—WHAT LURKS BEYOND THE HOLIDAY SEASON?

Over a dozen global central banks weigh in this week plus a potentially important BoC speech. Apparently, they have their collective sights set on quieter times through the holiday season and year-end. Expectations are laid out below.

BoC’s Macklem—Kicking Off the Mandate Review

Bank of Canada Governor Macklem delivers the customary pre-holiday Governor’s speech on Monday. Yes, Monday. Should be a blast. The title is “Economic factors shaping Canada’s monetary policy.” Text at 3:20pmET, no presser, but there will be time for probably light audience Q&A.

Macklem hinted this past week that a focus of the speech will be upon the process leading up to the next 5-year mandate review. He did so by responding to a question on the mandate by saying “I’ll have more to say about this next Monday in my year-end speech as we launch the review next year to be ready for 2026.”

The current Monetary Policy Framework Renewal agreement with the Federal Government expires in December 2026. The process toward a new agreement is long and arduous and typically ends with no material changes. But they have to do it.

The last one ran a “horse race” between competing monetary policy regimes including price level targeting, nominal GDP targeting, average inflation targeting, tweaking the inflation target itself, and a dual mandate like the Fed’s. That review indicated there would be an open mind, and concluded that the current system was largely best left (mostly) unchanged as per widely held expectations. The last five-year agreement is here and here were my thoughts on it at the time.

I say mostly unchanged because that prior review said that inflation targeting was only a “primary” goal of monetary policy and was peppered with references toward maximum employment and inclusion goals. Every central banker takes into account labour market conditions, but rates rallied on that day because of the references to maximum employment that made it appear as if the BoC’s 2% inflation target since 1991 was suddenly being downplayed somewhat. The fact that Finance Minister Freeland dominated the press conference with Macklem largely looking on didn’t help the optics.

This must be placed in the proper international context. Recall that the changes in governments in New Zealand led to messy volatility in the RBNZ’s mandate. The RBNZ was a pioneer—so was the BoC—at inflation targeting, but a change in government added a dual employment mandate, only for another change in government to go back to just inflation targeting. The RBI’s mandate has changed or been threatened to change many times.

As Canada’s economy goes into a period of magnified uncertainty, it needs a stable monetary policy regime. Now is not the time to experiment—or to seriously hint at changes—by adding further risk to the outlook. Every one of the seven reviews since the initial agreement in 1991 has largely left the framework intact; all of them are here if interested. And yet Macklem’s dovish bias and greater focus upon maximum employment than his predecessors could be put to the test should some tariff-related scenarios add to inflation while reducing employment. Such a scenario is feasible in tariff wars depending upon assumptions such as the degree and nature of Canadian retaliation. Markets might be confused by any mandate experimentation at the BoC.

BCCh—A Careful Cut

Chile’s central bank is expected to cut its overnight rate by 25bps on Tuesday. Consensus is nearly unanimous.

The central bank conveyed a bias toward future easing at its last decision on October 17^th when they cut by 25bps. Since then, there has been a lot of new information. The Chilean peso has depreciated with CLP down about 4% to the dollar and faces an uncertain outlook related to commodities and world growth. CPI inflation has continued to trend lower at 4.2% y/y in November, though wage growth is running at over 8% y/y. The economy grew a touch stronger than expected in Q3 (0.7% q/q SA nonannualized). Copper prices have moved somewhat lower since the middle of this year, but still remain fairly elevated against an uncertain outlook related to the strength of the Chinese economy and trade tensions (chart 5).

FOMC—S.E.P. Will Be D.O.A.

The two-day FOMC meeting starting on Tuesday will culminate in the delivery of the policy statement and revised Summary of Economic Projections including the dot plot at 2pmET on Wednesday. Then Powell takes to the podium thirty minutes later.

A 25bps cut is expected. It’s also basically fully priced. No changes to balance sheet management plans are expected as quantitative tightening is expected to remain on autopilot for now.

While more likely at the January FOMC or even later, there is the risk of at least further discussion around potentially tweaking relative rates of interest to funding markets. Recall that in the minutes to the prior meeting on November 6^th–7^th there was the following reference:

“Some participants remarked that, at a future meeting, there would be value in the Committee considering a technical adjustment to the rate offered at the ON RRP facility to set the rate equal to the bottom of the target range for the federal funds rate, thereby bringing the rate back into an alignment that had existed when the facility was established as a monetary policy tool.”

This discussion would have been led by FOMC members with a closer interest in funding markets, such as Dallas Fed President Logan (formerly the markets head at the NY Fed), Governor Waller, and NY’s Williams. The reference to “future meeting” as opposed to, say, ‘soon’ may indicate some patience.

But the bigger issue may be how the Committee alters the Summary of Economic Projections this time compared to the last full forecast update in September. A lot has changed since then. Don’t expect it all to be fully reflected in the refreshed forecasts. In fact, I wouldn’t pay that much serious attention to anyone’s forecast rounds just yet.

The FOMC’s last projections are compared to our current forecasts in charts 6–10. At a minimum, the Committee is likely to acknowledge data to date and revised up estimates for this year’s GDP growth. We expect weaker US growth next year and in 2026. The Committee has to revise up inflation estimates for this year, and we are slightly higher in 2026 than their prior projection. The same pattern applies in terms of core PCE. Finally, on the unemployment rate, the Committee is getting positively surprised this year and we think that may persist next year.

It’s likely that the FOMC reduces the amount of projected easing next year, but not by much while remaining on a path toward a neutral rate of around 3% in the outer years. Instead of a fed funds upper limit of 3.5% being conveyed for the end of 2025 (implying 100bps of cuts after this one), look for maybe 25bps to at most 50bps of fewer cuts (hence 50–75bps of cuts in 2025). Recent strength in the US economy including prices and wage figures (chart 11) lends toward a higher for longer bias. Our own projection estimates that the fed funds upper limit will end 2025 at 4%, implying 50bps of cuts in 2025 after this week’s.

The rub lies in the fact that—like many other forecasters—the FOMC and particularly Chair Powell don’t know what assumptions to make about policy shifts in 2025 by the Trump administration and are probably going to be unwilling to incorporate many of them now. If they do know, or think they know, then the fall back among central bankers is to only incorporate such expectations when they become fact or at least highly probable. Upgrading projections only on known information to date including data and wealth effects from financial market conditions should be treated carefully. It’s very unlikely that Committee members will incorporate any assumptions on tariffs, regulatory change, immigration policy shifts, and net fiscal policy shifts on the tax and spending sides combined. If they do, it will be a partial exercise maybe incorporating lower taxes for longer.

Because of this massive uncertainty surrounding the incoming administration’s policies, what effect they may have on markets and data, when such effects may arise, and how other countries may respond, the SEP and the dot plot shouldn’t be treated with much seriousness at this point. The bigger focus will be upon how the FOMC shifts at the next decision on January 29^th—nine days after inauguration day—and in the next SEP and dot plot in March.

Bank of Thailand—No More Surprises?

Thailand’s central bank is widely expected to hold its benchmark rate unchanged at 2.25% on Wednesday. It cut by 25bps in October in a surprise move. Following that move, Assistant Governor Panyanukul remarked that it was not the start of an easing cycle and was “just recalibrating the policy interest rate.” Like many other central banks, the US election and risks it poses to conditions across Asia may merit a wait and see approach.

Bank Indonesia—Rupiah Stability Remains the Focus

Consensus is somewhat divided toward Bank Indonesia’s next move on Wednesday. A little over half of forecasters expect a 25bps cut while the rest expect a hold at 6%. BI has held since a surprise 25bps cut back in September. Since then, however, the rupiah has depreciated by about 4% to the dollar and has recently continued along a mildly depreciating path. The central bank treats currency and broader market stability seriously including because of the implications for inflation given high import propensities. Uncertainty toward when the incoming US administration’s policies may be will likely retain a cautious bias at this meeting.

BoE—See You in 2025

The Bank of England delivers a policy decision on Thursday. Markets and consensus unanimously expect a hold with Bank Rate staying at 4.75%. A hold would extend the “gradual” guidance that has been marked by the first cut in August, then a skip in September, then another cut in November.

DepGov Swati Dhingra is expected to dissent in favour of another cut at this meeting. Depending on what happens in the CPI figures the day before, Dhingra’s view might get a boost especially in light of the pattern of broadening weakness in the UK economy that has only posted growth once in the past five months (chart 12).

Forward guidance is also unlikely to surprise. In a recent FT interview (here), Governor Andrew Bailey said “We always condition what we publish in terms of the projection on market rates, and so as you rightly say, that was effectively the view the market had.” When the interviewer asked if that meant the central forecast for 2025 was four cuts, he said “Yup. We’ve been looking at a number of potential paths ahead—and some of them are better than others.” Going in “gradual” fashion is Bailey’s mantra.

Bank of Japan—Maybe Waiting Would be Wise

The Bank of Japan delivers a fresh policy decision on Thursday. Markets have dramatically backed off pricing a decent shot at a hike this time (chart 13). About three-quarters of consensus expects a hold, but a notable one-quarter still expects a 25bps hike. The BoJ is not averse to delivering surprises.

The volatility in market pricing for this meeting has followed the somewhat erratic BoJ communications. After the last decision that held the policy rate unchanged on October 31^st, Governor Ueda indicated that the December meeting was ‘live’, code language for a possible hike. More recently, newswires have reported anonymous officials familiar with the BoJ’s thinking to be favouring a hold as it evaluates US policy risks, how the Japanese government’s stimulus plans may take shape, further risks to the yen after it has significantly depreciated since mid-September, more data, and further developments toward the Spring round of wage negotiations.

And yet the heated gains in core CPI combined with expectations for a third straight season of hot gains coming out of the Spring “Shunto” wage negotiations could give rising confidence in favour of tightening if not at this meeting, then the next one on January 24^th that is significantly priced for a hike. Four days after US inauguration day.

Central Bank of China Taiwan—Still Holding

CBCT is unanimously expected to leave its benchmark rate unchanged at 2% on Thursday. At 2.1% y/y, inflation remains comfortably near the 2% inflation target.

BSP—A Third Cut

The central bank of the Philippines is unanimously expected to cut by another 25bps on Thursday. It began easing with a 25bps cut in August followed by another in October. Typhoons have contributed to growth undershooting the 6–7% GDP target.

Riksbank—Central Bank Aligned with Markets, or Vice Versa?

Sweden’s central bank is widely expected to cut its policy rate by 25bps to 2.5% on Thursday. There will also be refreshed projections including explicit forward guidance for the policy rate.

The last statement in November that delivered a cut said “the policy rate may also be cut in December.” Love it. Clarity from a central bank, imagine that. The prior rate projections in September pointed toward achievement of about a 2% policy rate by fairly early in 2025 which is about where markets are now priced (chart 14).

Norges Bank—Not Yet!

Norway’s central bank is widely expected to hold its deposit rate unchanged at 4.5% on Thursday. That would extend the policy rate hold for a full year since the last move which was a 25bps hike one year ago. Consensus and markets are unanimous toward the decision, and markets are also priced for no change in January either. Refreshed forward guidance will be offered at this meeting (chart 15).

Speaking of central bank clarity, this one told us at the last decision that “The policy rate will most likely be kept at 4.5 percent to the end of 2024.” They had the results of the US election since the decision was on November 7^th. Norges has also observed a greater than expected increase in inflation with underlying CPI rising to 3% y/y in November.

PBOC—It’s Not Working So Far

China is not expected to alter banks’ loan prime rates on Thursday. They are expected to remain at 3.1% for the 1-year and 3.6% for the 5-year that is important to the property market. More easing has been guided by policymakers going into 2025 on both the monetary and fiscal policy fronts, but the outcome of this past week’s meetings was somewhat disappointing.

Credit demand has not responded well so far to a series of rate cuts that have lowered the 5-year rate by 105bps since October 2021 (chart 16). We can see this in the year-to-date growth in yuan-denominated loans (chart 17). Would you borrow if you felt house prices were still likely to remain in freefall (chart 18)? Would you go out on a limb when faced with potentially massive trade tensions? The sensitivity of money demand to falling rates is impaired to say the least. 

Banxico—How Judgemental Will it Be?

Our economists in Mexico City expect the central bank to cut by another 25bps on Thursday. That would take the overnight rate down to 10%. A significant minority within consensus thinks the central bank might cut by 50bps.

Inflation has continued to decline, hitting 4.6% y/y in October. Core inflation has also fallen to 3.6% y/y, extending the nearly two-year streak of decelerating readings (chart 19). A continued easing bias was conveyed in the last decision on November 14^th—after the US election—when the statement said “Looking ahead, the Board expects that the inflationary environment will allow further reference rate adjustments.” 

A 50bps cut may be delivered if Banxico wishes to pre-judge US tensions including prospects for a disinflationary surge in Mexico’s labour supply as migrants return but may be avoided until greater clarity emerges on prospects of US tariffs and how Mexico may retaliate.

BanRep—Follow the Trend

Colombia’s central bank is almost unanimously expected to cut its policy rate by 50bps on Friday. Our Bogota-based economist Jackeline Piraján Diaz is among the forecasters who are leaning that way.

BanRep has cut by 50bps at each of the past six decisions and so the trend is your friend here. Still, at 9.75%, the policy rate remains elevated as inflation has continued to decline and growth has recently disappointed with Q3 GDP up by just 0.2% q/q SA, or half of consensus.

Central Bank of Russia—Paying the Price

Russia’s central bank closes out the week with another large rate hike expected. Estimates of how large range from 100–300bps. Inflation has risen to nearly 9% y/y. The tumbling ruble points to further import price pressures as it has been on a steadily depreciating path of 23% to the dollar since August.

INFLATION—SOME MATTER MORE THAN OTHERS

Inflation reports from Canada, the US, Japan and the UK arrive this week. They will offer a combination of influences ranging from being very little to potentially impactful.

Canada—Renewed Softening Might Temporarily Validate the BoC’s Moves

Canada updates CPI for November on Tuesday, one day after Macklem’s speech and Freeland’s FES.

Not much hangs directly on this inflation update, but it may temporarily validate the BoC’s 50bps rate cut albeit that came with a more neutral/hawkish bias than previous decisions. There will be another CPI report on January 21st before the BoC’s next decision on January 29^th. Another jobs report is due out on January 10^th. And, of course, there is the issue of whether tariffs arrive on or shortly after US inauguration day on January 20^th. And so this inflation report may drive market volatility but not much by way of imminent decisions.

A headline reading of -0.3% m/m (seasonally unadjusted per convention) and 1.6% y/y (from 2% prior) is forecast. That would translate into seasonally adjusted dips of about -0.1% m/m for both headline CPI and traditional core CPI (ex-food and energy).

These estimates are uncertain, but I think there is a compelling rationale to expect a soft tone.

A shift in year-ago base effects as the comparison month moves from October 2023 to November 2023 would on its own lower CPI inflation a tick to 1.9% y/y. Further, November is a seasonally soft month for prices in Canada in m/m terms and that’s especially true in modern times (chart 20). November’s seasonal adjustment factors have not been displaying the kind of recency bias observed in the US for recent years (chart 21). Gasoline prices are unlikely to be a material unadjusted effect. 

And yet most of what I’ve used to arrive at a soft reading is a reversal of some outsized jumps the prior month. Shelter being one, particularly as seasonal property tax hikes were large at 6% m/m NSA, contributing a weighted 0.15% to the m/m rise in total CPI in October. Clothing and footwear is another as new seasonal lines rolled out in October and incorporate lagging cost and price changes. Ditto for passenger vehicle prices.

Key, however, will be the BoC’s preferred core gauges—trimmed mean CPI and weighted median CPI. They both accelerated the prior month. If the recent oscillating pattern holds in the context of mild slack in the economy, then this round might be set up for renewed softening (chart 22).

United States—An Afterthought to the FOMC

Speaking of meaningless updates, the Fed’s preferred inflation readings will be updated for November on Thursday and Friday. Meaningless because the FOMC will have had a very good idea of the number beforehand based on CPI and PPI, and because a great deal of information lies ahead before its next decision on January 29^th right after the BoC’s decision.

Thursday brings out Q3 core PCE revisions that may impact hand-off math for Friday’s estimate for November. What’s expected are a gain of 0.2% m/m for the total price deflator for aggregate consumer spending and a 0.2% m/m rise for core prices (ex-food and energy).

The known 0.3% m/m SA rise in core CPI tends to overshoot core PCE inflation. Further, the components to the producer price index that feed into PCE inflation will not be impactful this time (chart 23).

UK—Further Softening Before the BoE?

Here’s an inflation report that might matter a touch, notwithstanding fairly strong guidance recently offered by the Bank of England. The UK reading for November on Wednesday comes a day before the BoE’s policy decision. Markets expect no change at that meeting, but the reading could slightly impact the bias and the BoE is known to surprise markets.

At issue is whether core CPI will extend the pattern of soft readings of late. The month-over-month changes in seasonally unadjusted fashion per convention have been averaging below seasonal norms compared to like months in history for October, September and August. Consensus expects core CPI to pick up the pace toward around 3½% y/y, but it’s the evidence at the margin that will matter (ie: m/m). Continued progress on services inflation is needed but is headed in the right direction (chart 24). This time, however, a shift year-ago base effects could drive the y/y core reading to a bit higher, but the key will be the core m/m gauge.

Japan—An Ex-Post BoJ Reading

National CPI for November is slated to be updated on Thursday evening. It won’t matter much at all for two reasons.

For one, the Bank of Japan will have already made its decision hours before. For another, we already know that the fresher Tokyo core CPI reading picked up in November (chart 25). Tokyo core CPI rang in at 3.7% m/m SAAR and after a string of warm readings is clocking in at a three-month moving average of 4.1% m/m SAAR.

GLOBAL MACRO—SOME OTHER GEMS

Chart 26 summarizes the week’s global macro indicators that have not already been covered. The main areas of emphasis are as follows and with more to be offered about them via regular publishing throughout the week:

Canada should get a decent retail sales report for October on Friday, but flash guidance for November’s sales may matter more. Statcan had guided October sales were tracking a 0.7% m/m rise in nominal terms but this may be revised. Canada is tracking the biggest back-to-back quarterly gains in retail sales volumes in about a decade (chart 27).

US retail sales are expected to post a significant gain of about ½% m/m or more on Tuesday. November’s tally is likely to be lifted by a rise in gasoline prices and a roughly 3% increase in vehicle sales. Key will be core sales ex-food and energy as a guide to how the holiday shopping season is going. This will further inform expectations for Friday’s total consumer spending numbers that are also expected to post about a ½% m/m gain.

Global purchasing managers indices will be refreshed with December readings. Australia, Japan, the UK, Eurozone, US and India are all due out at the start of the week.

UK jobs and wages (Tuesday) may also carry implications for the BoE’s decision on Thursday. The UK also refreshes retail sales on Friday.

New Zealand will join Canada with its own half-year economic and fiscal update at the start of the week just ahead of Q3 GDP on Wednesday that may mark entry into a technical recession.