- Chile: GDP contracted 0.1% y/y in February (-0.5% m/m)
- Mexico: Downward revisions to GDP growth forecasts; remittances decline
- Peru: Base effect causes inflation to continue falling in March; New February growth indicators are mixed, but good enough
CHILE: GDP CONTRACTED 0.1% Y/Y IN FEBRUARY (-0.5% M/M)
- In the absence of one-time effects that affected February's print, GDP is expected to return to growth in March
On Tuesday, April 1st, the Central Bank (BCCh) released February GDP data showing a contraction of 0.1% y/y, a figure that was below market expectations (Economist Survey: +1.0%; consensus: +0.1%), although it satisfies our view of a negative reading that we raised after the January GDP release (see Latam Daily, March 3rd). On the one hand, the y/y decline is due to one-off effects, such as the negative calendar effect of the comparison base (2024 was a leap year), and the impact that the electricity blackout at the end of the month would have had on economic activity, especially on mining. Overall, the economy again showed a year-on-year contraction after seven months of uninterrupted growth. On the other hand, a 0.5% m/m drop was also observed in non-mining GDP.
There was a widespread decline across economic sectors (chart 1 and 2). Seasonally adjusted figures showed that the largest negative contributions within the non-mining sectors came from trade (wholesale and retail) and services, especially business services, which lost some of the momentum shown in January. On the other hand, the sustained growth experienced by the industrial sector stands out positively, with four consecutive months of seasonally adjusted growth.

Fiscal execution is running at a fast pace. According to figures from the Budget Office, 15.5% of budgeted spending was executed in February, the highest level seen in recent years, driven by accelerated public investment, which reached 10.7%, even above last year’s figures. In this regard, capital spending grew 10% y/y in real terms in February, mainly thanks to faster investment in public works, housing, and health.
Positive figures are expected to return in March, with growth of around 3% y/y. This is thanks to a more favourable calendar effect (one additional business day) and a recovery in the dynamism of the sectors that were affected by the blackout in February, particularly mining. These improved domestic economic activity figures are expected to continue to support the CLP’s appreciation against the US dollar and our trading partners. We reaffirm our 2025 GDP growth projection of 2.5%, which assumes a 6% expansion in total investment and over 2% for private consumption.
—Aníbal Alarcón
MEXICO: DOWNWARD REVISIONS TO GDP GROWTH FORECASTS; REMITTANCES DECLINE
The results of Banxico’s Private Sector Expectations Survey showed downward revisions (table 1). The most significant change was again the growth forecast for this year, with the consensus dropping from 0.8% to 0.5% due to the observed weakness in recent indicators and uncertainty regarding trade policy between Mexico and the United States. With an increasing likelihood of a less integrated trade policy, several analysts are revising their expectations downward, with some even predicting a contraction as the baseline scenario for the year. For our part, we will revise our forecast in the coming weeks, once U.S. and Mexico measures in this area have been announced.

On the other hand, following Banxico’s forward guidance on less restrictive rate levels, analysts lowered their expected year-end rate to 8.0% and to 7.50% by the end of 2026. Possibly, several respondents agree that economic weakness will generate downward pressure on price formation, as expected inflation remained virtually unchanged at 3.70% for headline and 3.76% for the core component by the end of 2025.
Additionally, the forecasted USDMXN at the end of the period dropped from 20.85 to 20.80. Recent behavior of the USDMXN (coming back to the low 20s) may have prompted a statistical revision in the data, but we believe that the risks of a lower interest rate differential between Mexico and the United States, as well as the imposition of tariffs and lower economic growth, could result in greater depreciation. Therefore, we maintain our forecast of $21.30 and $21.50 for the end of 2025.
Looking ahead, we believe that downward revisions to growth forecasts will continue. Regardless of possible trade agreements between Mexico and the United States, the mere uncertainty will continue to affect the confidence of economic agents. Additionally, indicators from the first months of the year show greater economic weakness than initially anticipated, necessitating downward adjustments in forecasts.
Remittances show an annual decline amid uncertainty. According to Banco de México, remittances for February amounted to $4.458 billion, representing a year-on-year contraction of -0.8%. Over the past twelve months, remittances totaled $64.797 billion, the highest accumulated figure for February. The total number of transfers also decreased by -0.2%, resulting in an average drop of -0.6% to $381 dollars. Looking ahead, we believe the negative impact of the Trump administration’s immigration policies will continue, along with an expectations of lower growth. However, this effect could be offset by potential tax cuts on tips in the United States. Consequently, the decline in remittances will translate into lower private consumption in Mexico in the early part of the year.
—Rodolfo Mitchell, Brian Pérez & Miguel Saldaña
PERU: BASE EFFECT CAUSES INFLATION TO CONTINUE FALLING IN MARCH
Monthly inflation was once again positive in April; however, due to a base effect, annual inflation continued to decrease (chart 3). We maintain our forecast for headline inflation at 2.3% at end-2025 and 4.50% for the terminal reference rate.

General inflation increased by +0.8% monthly in March, above the +0.6% expected by Bloomberg’s market consensus, but closer to our estimate of +0.9% (chart 4). The figure was high; however, it was lower than that recorded in March 2024 (1.0%). Consequently, annual inflation slowed from 1.5% in February to 1.3% in March, remaining below the midpoint of the Central Reserve Bank (BCR)’s target range.

The increase in general inflation during the month was mainly driven by higher prices in two categories: (1) Education (+3.4%), due to seasonal factors, which was expected given the start of the school season, and (2) Food and non-alcoholic beverages (+1.85%), due to price corrections in products with significant weight in the basic basket, such as chicken and eggs.
Core inflation, the trend component that excludes food and energy, also increased by +0.6% in March, similar to the historical average of the last 20 years (+0.6%) but below the level recorded in the same month of 2024 (+0.9%). In year-over-year terms, it decreased from 2.1% in February to 1.9% in March.
In the coming months, the base effect present during February and March will no longer apply. Inflation is expected to have a modest upward and conservative trend but remain below the midpoint of the target range (2.0%) until 3Q25 and continue increasing to 2.3% by the end of the year due to a base effect in 4Q.
As for the BCRP’s reference rate, we expect no changes in April. The arguments provided in March would still persist in April, namely good dynamics in economic activity and international uncertainty caused by U.S. trade policies and geopolitical conflicts. The BCRP could be encouraged to make the next cut once the Federal Reserve (Fed) does. There is a higher probability that the Fed will reduce its reference rate still in June (according to market consensus); consequently, the BCRP could make its next cut by late 2Q25 or at the beginning of 3Q25.
—Ricardo Avila
NEW FEBRUARY GROWTH INDICATORS ARE MIXED, BUT GOOD ENOUGH
February GDP growth indicators were released on April 1st. Prior to this release, we had penciled in the possibility of GDP growth coming in in a range from 2.5% y/y to 3.0% for February. The newly released figures point to growth that is closer to 3.0% y/y, with mild upside (chart 5). This level is not bad when you consider that February 2025 had one day less than February 2024. Taking the extra day into account, growth would be broadly aligned with the approximately 4% monthly growth of previous months.

The two main indicators that were released were mining GDP growth and Fishing GDP growth (table 2). Mining GDP fell 1.4%, y/y. Mining activities are particularly sensitive to the number of days in a month, so we were actually expecting an even greater decline. Fishing GDP growth, nearly 25%, is less relevant due to its low weight in an off-season month.

The 0.9% y/y decline in electricity demand is, no doubt, a reflection of less days in the month. Most other indicators are comfortably positive. Public investment growth was strong for a second consecutive month, and suggest that our full-year public investment growth forecast of 5.8% might prove to be an underestimation. Prior to February’s 16% y/y growth, public sector investment rose 45% in January. Add February’s public investment to encouraging cement sales growth of 4.6%, and Construction GDP growth should be quite robust in February.
Growth of 3.0% in February is in line with our forecast of 3.3% growth for full-year 2025. February GDP will be released on April 15th.
Another positive event that could potentially have some bearing on growth further down the line was the government announcement that it had designed a deregulation policy. This announcement is drawing some expectation, even though similar announcements in the past have proved disappointing. If, however, these measures are implemented fully and well, they could provide the basis for a greater acceleration in growth over time. The measures were the result of two months of work with private sector business leaders, which gives credibility to the formulation and adequacy of the measures. Their implementation is another matter. Much of the red tape that ties up investment in the country occurs at the local and regional government levels, and this might be a tangle that is a bit more difficult to untie.
The package includes 402 measures, nearly half of which are geared to eliminate specific instances of red tape. There are also more general measures to strengthen institutions, improve management procedures and shorten timelines. The packages also include 42 measures to promote private investment.
—Guillermo Arbe
DISCLAIMER
This report has been prepared by Scotiabank Economics as a resource for the clients of Scotiabank. Opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are our own as of the date hereof and are subject to change without notice. The information and opinions contained herein have been compiled or arrived at from sources believed reliable but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to their accuracy or completeness. Neither Scotiabank nor any of its officers, directors, partners, employees or affiliates accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of this report or its contents.
These reports are provided to you for informational purposes only. This report is not, and is not constructed as, an offer to sell or solicitation of any offer to buy any financial instrument, nor shall this report be construed as an opinion as to whether you should enter into any swap or trading strategy involving a swap or any other transaction. The information contained in this report is not intended to be, and does not constitute, a recommendation of a swap or trading strategy involving a swap within the meaning of U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulation 23.434 and Appendix A thereto. This material is not intended to be individually tailored to your needs or characteristics and should not be viewed as a “call to action” or suggestion that you enter into a swap or trading strategy involving a swap or any other transaction. Scotiabank may engage in transactions in a manner inconsistent with the views discussed this report and may have positions, or be in the process of acquiring or disposing of positions, referred to in this report.
Scotiabank, its affiliates and any of their respective officers, directors and employees may from time to time take positions in currencies, act as managers, co-managers or underwriters of a public offering or act as principals or agents, deal in, own or act as market makers or advisors, brokers or commercial and/or investment bankers in relation to securities or related derivatives. As a result of these actions, Scotiabank may receive remuneration. All Scotiabank products and services are subject to the terms of applicable agreements and local regulations. Officers, directors and employees of Scotiabank and its affiliates may serve as directors of corporations.
Any securities discussed in this report may not be suitable for all investors. Scotiabank recommends that investors independently evaluate any issuer and security discussed in this report, and consult with any advisors they deem necessary prior to making any investment.
This report and all information, opinions and conclusions contained in it are protected by copyright. This information may not be reproduced without the prior express written consent of Scotiabank.
™ Trademark of The Bank of Nova Scotia. Used under license, where applicable.
Scotiabank, together with “Global Banking and Markets”, is a marketing name for the global corporate and investment banking and capital markets businesses of The Bank of Nova Scotia and certain of its affiliates in the countries where they operate, including; Scotiabank Europe plc; Scotiabank (Ireland) Designated Activity Company; Scotiabank Inverlat S.A., Institución de Banca Múltiple, Grupo Financiero Scotiabank Inverlat, Scotia Inverlat Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V., Grupo Financiero Scotiabank Inverlat, Scotia Inverlat Derivados S.A. de C.V. – all members of the Scotiabank group and authorized users of the Scotiabank mark. The Bank of Nova Scotia is incorporated in Canada with limited liability and is authorised and regulated by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada. The Bank of Nova Scotia is authorized by the UK Prudential Regulation Authority and is subject to regulation by the UK Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the UK Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of The Bank of Nova Scotia's regulation by the UK Prudential Regulation Authority are available from us on request. Scotiabank Europe plc is authorized by the UK Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority and the UK Prudential Regulation Authority.
Scotiabank Inverlat, S.A., Scotia Inverlat Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V, Grupo Financiero Scotiabank Inverlat, and Scotia Inverlat Derivados, S.A. de C.V., are each authorized and regulated by the Mexican financial authorities.
Not all products and services are offered in all jurisdictions. Services described are available in jurisdictions where permitted by law.